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The standard theory of optimal jurisdictional size hinges on the existence of economies of scale 
in the provision of local public goods and services. However, despite its relevance for forced 
local amalgamation programs and related policies, the empirical evidence on the existence of 
such economies of scale remains elusive. The main goal of this paper is to produce an updated 
and comprehensive quantitative review of the existence of economies of scale in the provision 
of local public goods using a meta-analysis approach to systematize the wide range of empirical 
approaches and modeling frameworks found in the previous literature. Our analysis confirms 
the presence of moderately increasing to constant returns to scale in the provision of local 
services across traditional local service sectors such as education, water and sanitation, and 
garbage collection. We identify best practices for future empirical research in this area, which 
should rely on physical output as the metric of activity, production cost data as the measure of 
input expense, and a translog specification function for the modeling of cost functions. Finally, 
we find evidence that the determinants of output cost elasticity include bidirectional publication 
bias and population density but do not include the presence or absence of modern “lean” 
production technologies or the (perceived) capital intensity of the sector, contrary to 
conventional wisdom. These findings have significant policy implications for countries 
considering jurisdictional consolidation programs. 
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The standard theory of optimal jurisdictional size developed by Oates (1972) and 
extended later on by other authors (e.g., Alesina & Spolaore, 2003) hinges on the existence of 
economies of scale in the provision of local public goods and services. However, the empirical 
evidence on the existence of such economies of scale remains elusive. Obtaining sound evidence 
on this issue is as relevant as ever for efficient decentralization policy design. Many countries 
have embarked over the years on forced jurisdictional consolidation or amalgamation programs 
based on the supposedly insufficient economies of scale in the delivery of local public services 
among their existing, and allegedly small, local governments. However, the evidence for such 
moves is far from conclusive, as Gendzwill et al. (2020) show after reviewing 31 studies for 14 
countries implementing territorial reforms in recent times. Hence, this issue calls for a systematic 
and in-depth quantitative analysis that summarizes and evaluates the evidence available. The 
main goal of this paper is to produce an updated and comprehensive quantitative review of this 
important issue using a meta-analysis approach. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: in section two, we review the definitions 
and different interpretations in the literature concerning economies of scale in the delivery of 
public services. Section three provides a summary of the stylized facts on economies of scale in 
the public economics literature. Section four offers a systematic quantitative review of the 
literature as the initial step to conducting the meta-analysis. Section five shows the results from 
the meta-analysis’ regressions. Section six concludes. 
2. On Alternative Definitions of Economies of Scale 
In its classical definition, a production process is characterized by economies of scale if:  
“when all inputs are increased by a certain factor λ, output increases by a factor larger than that 





production of a good or service without increasing productions costs in the same proportion. The 
sources of such economies of scale are varied. They could be derived from the specialization of 
the production process (which may only be viable for larger levels of output); they may originate 
from increased bargaining power with suppliers once production increases (leading to lower or 
discounted prices for inputs); or they may be related to the spread of fixed costs across larger 
production levels (thus reducing average prices).  
The most commonly used mathematical formulation of economies of scale is owed to 






. Economies of scale (S) or increasing returns to 
scale (used interchangeably here forth) exist when S >1; that is, when the marginal cost of 
production is below the average cost. Constant or decreasing returns to scale exist when S is 
equal or less than unity, respectively. In elasticity terms, economies of scale exist when the cost 
elasticity of output is smaller than unity (𝜀𝜀𝑦𝑦 < 1).1 
The literature has predominantly used this definition of economies of scale, although 
other contributions have also merited attention. In particular, Caves et al. (1984), in their analysis 
of scale economies of local service airlines’ costs, include a measure of network length (or points 
served) for the calculation of economies of scale. In their interpretation, short-term economies of 
scale are defined as 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆 = 1
𝜀𝜀𝑦𝑦+𝜀𝜀𝑁𝑁
 where 𝜀𝜀𝑁𝑁 is the cost elasticity of the network length. As in 
Baumol et al, returns to scale exist when RTS >1. In addition, Caves et al. (1984) argue that the 
estimation of long-term economies of scale needs to take into account the quasi-fixed production 
 






inputs (Z) and thus 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆 = 1−𝜀𝜀𝑍𝑍
𝜀𝜀𝑦𝑦+𝜀𝜀𝑁𝑁
, with 𝜀𝜀𝑍𝑍 as the cost elasticity of quasi-fixed production inputs.2  
The empirical literature on the existence of economies of scale in the production of public 
services has concentrated on the estimation of the cost elasticity of output, using a variety of 
modeling frameworks. However, important contributions to the literature have adopted the 
interpretation of economies of scale proposed by Caves et al. (1984), such as in Mizutani and 
Urakami (2001), Aubert and Reynaud (2005), or Filippini and Prioni (2003).  
3. Stylized Facts in the Literature 
An initial review of the literature unveils a series of stylized facts which help shape our 
quantitative analysis below.3  
3.1 Capital vs. labor-intensive services 
From production theory, it would be reasonable to assume that economies of scale are 
more likely to be found in capital-intensive goods or services, where the investment in capital 
goods (i.e., fixed costs) can be spread across more units of output (Dollery & Fleming, 2006; 
Bel, 2013). As we see below, this conjecture is only partially fulfilled. 
In Chile, Albala-Bertrand and Mamatzakis (2004) find economies of scale in the 
provision of transport, sewerage, and power grid services. Bel (2005) and Alvarez et al. (2003) 
show (for Spain) that solid waste collection and processing offers important savings in 
production costs derived from larger client populations. This is a finding shared both by Callan 
and Thomas (2001) in their study of 110 municipalities in the Massachusetts area and by 
McDavid (2000), who studies cost patterns for 327 local governments of less than 1000 citizens 
 
2 By quasi-fixed production inputs, the authors refer to the fact that, although in the long-run all inputs are 
traditionally assumed to be variable, some of them, including capital and labor for instance, can be partially 
adjustable.  
3 This section benefits from earlier reviews including Boyne (1995) and Andrews et al. (2002) in the area of 





in Canada. Conversely, Bel and Mur (2009) do not find scale economies on solid waste services 
in small rural municipalities in the region of Aragon (Spain), insofar as most of them rely upon 
intermunicipal cooperation or outsourcing. This conclusion is reinforced by the empirical 
analysis of Hortas-Rico and Salinas (2014). Supra-municipal aggregation of services would fade 
scale economies. 
Concerning the water sector, Cunha Marques and De Witte (2011) found significant 
economies of scale, with an optimal scale of the utilities located between 160,000 and 180,000 
inhabitants, well over the average Portuguese municipality (their study population). These 
figures are close to those estimated by Turley et al. (2018) for Ireland, where economies of scale 
are found to exist up to 140,000 inhabitants. For Spain, Prieto et al. (2015) also find significant 
economies of scale for water supply, sewerage, and water cleansing; this effect would be 
reinforced by population density. 
In the area of urban transport, seemingly contradictory results are found depending on the 
sample used for the analysis. For example, Berechman (1983) finds economies of scale in the 
operation of buses in Israel but constant returns to scale are found by Matas and Raymond (1998) 
for Spain and by Filippini and Prioni (2003) for Switzerland. However, moderate increasing 
returns to scale are found by Farsi et al. (2007) for Swiss urban transport. More recently, Avenali 
et al. (2016), using data for Italy, show the existence of weak economies of scale and only for 
small size services. There may be additional factors specific to transportation modes and 
geographic conditions that influence transportation scale economies and that do not have the 
same, or as strong an, effect on other sectors’ economies of scale. 
More conclusive is the evidence obtained in the area of garbage collection, where solid 





literature, Bel (2013) also concludes that this effect is diluted when jurisdiction population is 
over a threshold of between 20,000 and 50,000 inhabitants. Hence, increasing returns would be 
stronger in countries where the average size of municipalities is smaller.  
A corollary of the above proposition, based on production and cost theory, is that labor-
intensive local services should offer less potential for economies of scale. A pioneering reference 
from this perspective is the work of Hirsch (1959) for police services in U.S. municipalities, who 
found no evidence of economies of scale. Analogously, Ahlbrandt (1973) examined 44 cities and 
districts of Seattle’s metropolitan area and found no evidence of economies of scale in the 
provision of firefighting services. Similar conclusions are reached by Alt (1971) and Boaden 
(1971) and Danzinger (1978) in the cases of England and Wales. Furthermore, Ostrom and Parks 
(1973), Dilorenzo (1981), and Gyimah-Brempong (1987) find evidence of higher production 
costs for firefighting and police services with the greater population size of the jurisdiction in the 
United States. However, this early literature was not totally void of positive evidence on 
economies of scale. For example, Bodkin and Conklin (1971) report declining average costs of 
production with higher population size for police and fire services in local governments in the 
United States. The study, however, is substantially old and there has been considerable 
technological change in the provision of policing that could substantially change the scale 
economies estimate.  
In the case of the provision of public schooling, evidence of economies of scale is found 
by Chambers (1978), Butler and Monk (1985), Callan and Santerre (1990), Duncombe et al. 
(1995), Jimenez (1986), Reschovsky and Imazeki (1997, 1999), and Andrews (2013). On the 
other hand, Gyimah-Brempong and Gyapong (1991) find decreasing returns to scale in the 





studies on education services has been that scale economies vanish at relatively low levels of 
student enrollment. In this same vein, Duncombe et al. (1995) show that the consolidation of 
school districts in the State of New York may have offered savings in education costs, although 
the gains were limited to the consolidation of districts with fewer than 500 students. A similar 
study for Iowa by Edelman & Knudsen (1990) concluded that the gains in terms of economies of 
scale were found for student populations between 800 and 900. For the state of Maine, Deller 
and Rudnicki (1992) estimated the optimal size of the education district to be at around 2,000 
students. These studies, however, predate widespread use of internet and mobile technologies, 
which could impact estimates.   
Concerning other labor-intensive public services, Hortas-Rico and Salinas (2014) do not 
find economies of scale in social services in Spanish municipalities. In the case of security 
(municipal police), scant savings in cost are shown and only up until 500 inhabitants. Moreover, 
they only find evidence of significant economies of scale in the case of general administration 
for up to 20,000 inhabitants. 
3.2 Measurement, measurement, measurement 
The mixed evidence on economies of scale gathered from the empirical literature may 
well be due, at least partially, to critical differences in the measures of output and production 
costs used in the different analyses. In their review of previous works on the existence of 
economies of scale in Australian local governments, Byrnes and Dollery (2002) conclude that, 
even when homogeneous goods are analyzed, the evidence as to whether economies of scale 
exist in their production is inconclusive. They argue that inaccurate measures of 
output/production and costs are partly to blame for the variety of results found in the literature. 





of scale in public service delivery is in fact an old one. Tiebout (1960) criticized Hirsch’s (1959) 
seminal contributions to the literature for his use of population as a proxy for public service 
output. Tiebout (1960; p. 444) argued that “there is no necessary relationship between population 
and either the output or quality of the good.” In fact, larger population may lead, Tiebout argued, 
to larger per capita expenditures, implying no economies of scale. Studies using population as a 
proxy for output levels are rare nowadays, although they represented a substantial share of early 
works in this empirical area. 
The use of expenditure data as a substitute or instead of cost data for the estimation of 
cost functions has also been criticized for obvious reasons. Changes in per capita expenditures in 
a public service may be due to reasons other than production costs; including administrative 
inefficiencies (Tiebout, 1960; Breton, 1965; Duncombe & Yinger, 2007). As cost data have been 
made increasingly available, empirical works have favored their use and the number of academic 
contributions using per capita expenditure as a proxy for average cost has declined over time.  
There is also substantial evidence in the literature that the size of economies of scale is 
largely affected by the measure of output selected, even when the measures refer to the same 
service. In their study of cost of bus services provision in Switzerland, Filippini and Prioni 
(2003) find larger economies of scale when the output measure is the number of bus stops as 
opposed to bus-kilometers. This finding corroborates the results from Berechman and Giuliano 
(1984), who document diseconomies of scale in bus operation in the United States if bus-miles 
are used as the output measure, and instead economies of scale were found if revenue per 
passenger is used. Unfortunately, in most cases, there may not be a clear superior choice of 
output measure. Therefore, we need to be aware that evidence on the existence of economies of 






Finally, Tran et al. (2018) outline the relevance of controlling for population density 
when analyzing the extent of scale economies attached to involved population size. Given the 
strong correlation between both variables, omitting the first one upwardly biases the effect of the 
second. Using data for 68 Australian municipalities, they show that local government 
expenditure is characterized by significant economies of scale. However, once municipalities are 
stratified by population density, the evidence for scale economies largely disappears. In contrast, 
evidence for Brazilian municipalities reported by Bernardelli et al. (2020) shows that economies 
of scale remain when the analysis controls for the effect of population density.  
3.3 A U-shaped average cost function 
A third salient finding in the literature is the concentration of economies of scale in 
smaller (population-wise) jurisdictions in studies using jurisdictions (as opposed to production 
units) as the focus of their analysis. This would appear to signal the expected U-shape of the 
long-term average cost curve for public service production. The seminal Hirsch (1959) study 
reports evidence of economies of scale in firefighting services in municipalities of less than 
100,000 people and increasing average costs over that population size. In the same vein, Bodkin 
& Conklin (1971) find evidence of declining average costs in police and firefighting services for 
localities of between 5,000 and 10,000 people. Additionally, Gyimah-Brempong (1987), in his 
analysis of the Florida case, estimated that diseconomies of scale in the provision of police 
services start at population levels of around 50,000 residents. Sole-Olle & Bosch (2005) find 
substantial economies of scale for provision of local government services in Spanish 
municipalities with a population below 5,000 citizens but growing unit costs of provision until 
the population is over or about 50,000. Using more sophisticated spatial econometric tools, the 





for Spanish municipalities over the period 2003-2011. Total current spending decreases with 
population and increases with the square of population, suggesting optimal size would be slightly 
over 10,000 inhabitants. Again, for Spain, the recent contribution by Piñero et al. (2021) shows a 
U-shape with the minimum attained for population sizes in the bracket 5,000-10,000. However, 
this result is not based on econometric estimates, but on careful descriptive analysis of data. 
Using a sample of Catalonian (Spanish) municipalities, Bel & Fagueda (2009) show 
evidence of substantial economies of scale in solid waste collection (attained by inter-municipal 
cooperation in the provision of this service) for municipalities below 20,000 citizens, but no 
gains in unit costs for municipalities over that population. In Sweden, Nelson (1992) shows that 
savings in the production of local services derived from municipal consolidation seem limited to 
municipalities of very small population size (below 2,000 citizens after the consolidation). In 
light of these and other contributions, Bish (2001; p.14) concludes that approximately 80 percent 
of local government activities do not possess economies of scale beyond relatively small 
municipalities with populations of 10,000 to 20,000.  
The review of the previous empirical literature also shows different within-country results 
in terms of whether economies of scale are present, depending on the sample of jurisdictions and 
databases used. This result is more apparent in a third group of studies which analyze overall 
expenditure patterns before and after processes of jurisdictional consolidation or inter-municipal 
cooperation. This may be a result of aggregating all local expenditures on public goods and 
services. The evidence on economies of scale would become even more inconclusive after 
aggregating both capital- and labor-intensive services, with different potential in the reduction of 
average production costs due to larger volume. For example, in a series of studies in the early 





(measured as total local public expenditure, excluding social services) with higher population 
size in the U.K., a result also partially confirmed by Mehay (1981). Byrnes and Dollery (2002) 
review a good number of studies with similar but also contradictory findings following the local 
government consolidation process that took place in Australia during the 1990s. More recently, 
Miyazaki (2018) analyzes the relationship between municipal consolidation in Japan, 
discovering that per capita current expenditure does increase after consolidation, but 
subsequently they gradually fall. The author suggest that this result could be explained by factors 
such as internalization of spillovers in local public good provision, increased heterogeneity of 
preferences in consolidated municipalities, and/or less competitiveness among municipalities. 
Blom-Hansen et al. (2016) also conclude with a pessimistic view on the net gains of 
amalgamations. Using a differences-in-differences approach on mergers in Denmark, they 
conclude that cost savings in some areas are offset by deterioration in others, while for most 
public services, jurisdiction size did not matter at all. Moreover, the analysis by Blesse and 
Baskaran (2016) on Germany add two suggestive results. First, reductions in administrative 
expenditures are limited to compulsory (not voluntary) mergers. Second, reductions in costs are 
more relevant in the case of mergers with a larger number of participants and when there is a 
dominant partner in the merger (annexations). 
3.4 Modeling frameworks for the cost function 
The empirical literature on economies of scale in local public service delivery has seen 
three somewhat overlapping but otherwise well-differentiated stages in the modeling of the cost 
functions of the production process. Early works in this area used a linear function, quadratic in 
the measure of output, to establish the existence of U-shaped cost curves (Hirsch 1959, 1965; 
Bodkin & Conklin, 1971; Knapp, 1982; Kumar, 1983, among others). The reporting standards of 





of the articles reviewed from this early stage do not provide descriptive statistics of the variables 
used, naturally making the calculation of the elasticities difficult. The sample of observations for 
the meta-analysis below suffers therefore from a bias towards more recent articles.  
A second wave of contributions to the analysis of economies of scale in local service 
delivery incorporates logarithmic cost functions that allow the direct estimation of the cost 
elasticity of production. This sub-sample of works assumes a Cobb-Douglas production function, 
a modeling framework that still incorporates important limitations in the analysis of economies 
of scale, such as the assumed constant elasticity of substitution of factors of production and 
returns to scale and the homotheticity of the production function (Gyimah-Brempong, 1987). The 
largest number of available works has used this modeling framework, including the seminal 
contributions from Stevens (1978) in the sector of refuse collection, Duncombe et al. (1995) in 
education, and Christoffersen et al. (2007) in the cleaning of schools in Denmark.  
The third and more recent wave of empirical works in this area have heavily favored the 
use of the translogarithmic cost functions as a modeling framework. In contrast to the Cobb-
Douglas function, the multi-product translog cost function places fewer restrictions on the 
parameters (e.g., does not assume constant elasticity of substitution of factors of production), and 
allows for the analysis of multi-product production processes that are common in certain sectors 
(e.g., primary and secondary education for instance). An early contribution in the area of bus 
transport that uses the translog modeling framework is that of Berechman (1983), but the 
framework has been applied to every possible service including Drake and Simper (2002) in the 
area of police, Prieto et al. (2015) in sewerage, paving and lighting, Fabbri and Fraquelli (2000) 
and Prieto et al. (2015) in water supply, and Jimenez (1986) in education. The more sophisticated 





solid estimates of economies of scale, so any quantitative analysis of the literature must control 
for this important development. However, more recent contributions explore the possibility of 
relying upon even more flexible functional forms. For instance, Bikker and Van der Linde (2016) 
compare results for administrative costs using the translog cost function with up to three 
alternatives to analyze local public administration expenditure in Netherlands. 
In conclusion, evidence of economies of scale for local public good provision that would 
justify Oates' (1972) theoretical argument for larger governmental units can be found but needs 
to be adequately contextualized. To the significant empirical limitations related to the 
measurement of output and cost of service production, we must add the complications generated 
by different (and coexisting) technologies and the specificities of geographical areas. Our initial 
review of the literature leads us to conclude that economies of scale, when found, are sector 
specific, population bound, and perhaps even temporary in their range and size, depending on the 
available technologies of production of the particular time period. Economies of scale arising 
from larger size jurisdictions may only exist for a small number of locally provided services. We 
next turn to our attempt to produce more precise information on these issues. 
4. Meta-analysis: A Systematic Quantitative Literature Review 
Following Stanley (2001) our meta-analysis is structured in four stages. 
4.1 Identifying all relevant studies and choosing a common metric 
The first stage is to identify as complete a sample of studies in the area of interest as 
possible. We reviewed 115 empirical studies in total from a variety of sources and journals on 
economies of scale in local public service delivery, including several PhD dissertations and 
unpublished papers.  
The scope of our meta-analysis includes all published or unpublished empirical papers in 





and Dissertation abstracts) and the Google Scholar, Google, and Bing standard search engines, 
without any time-period restriction. We also contacted several authors for unpublished papers, 
dissertations, and government reports, but only with mixed success. In addition, the 
bibliographies of all papers reviewed were scanned for additional studies, applying a “snowball” 
approach to study identification. 
Having obtained 115 papers overall on the topic, the selection of pieces to be included in 
the meta-analysis used the following criteria: First, we selected only papers that referred to local 
government-provided services. There exist substantial contributions on the economies of scale of 
some public services that are not local in nature, such as power generation or regional 
transportation services. These non-local studies were excluded from the analysis. Second, we 
eliminated from our pool of papers those which did not use regression analysis as the main 
estimation methodology for economies of scale. This may have biased the sample towards more 
recent contributions, which are more prone to use regressions as opposed to other methodologies, 
such as simple correlation coefficients.  
Third, the review of the literature unveiled a series of studies using the production 
function approach to the analysis of local public service provision. None of these studies can be 
incorporated into the dataset as they do not truly test for economies of scale but rather for the 
impact of financing levels on critical performance indicators. In these studies, the left-hand side 
variable is traditionally a measure of service quality (i.e., average value of standardized tests in 
education, etc.), not the production costs. Thus, they offer complementary evidence which cannot 
be incorporated into our quantitative review.  
Fourth, the selection of our variable of interest introduced additional limitations to the 





that economies of scale exist in the production of local public services. Note that we bundle all 
local services. We do so because, with very few exceptions, local governments are expected to 
take on the delivery of a standard of all local services and not just a selection of them. 
Asymmetric assignments of functional responsibilities across local governments are rare in the 
international experience. Thus, for example, in most countries jurisdictional consolidation is 
sought for and requires the delivery of all services to a larger population, as opposed to a small 
or selective set of public services.4  
Given the theoretical framework discussed and the proposition we want to test, the 
natural variable of interest for our meta-analysis is the cost elasticity of output. This statistic best 
summarizes the empirical results in the previous literature.5 The use of the cost elasticity of 
output as our measure of economies of scale immediately imposes additional restrictions on our 
sample of studies. Papers where the statistic is not reported or from which it cannot be calculated 
were discarded. As discussed, several of the early contributions in this area use a linear (and 
quadratic) cost functional form. When descriptive statistics are provided, we can calculate the 
attached elasticity and thus the paper is added to the dataset. In many cases, however, such 
information was not available and the paper was discarded.  
The selection process outlined above left us eventually with 56 studies that reported 76 
values of the cost elasticity of output for different services. Of those 76 observations, 55 reported 
their attached standard errors and 21 did not. The availability of standard errors is crucial as the 
meta-analysis essentially weights the observations by their variance. In their absence, other 
 
4 If special districts exist for the delivery of separate services, as is the case in the U.S. with school districts, etc., 
then it can make sense to conduct the study for unbundled services. In this case, the number of observations 
available to conduct reliable statistical analysis can become the challenge. 
5 Earlier contributions in the literature used the total cost of production (in monetary terms) as the dependent 





measures of study size can be used, such as the inverse of the degrees of freedom of the study, 
but generally they are less satisfactory. Our empirical work will include estimates of the average 
“true” value of economies of scale for those observations for which standard errors are reported 
and for the whole sample of observations (76) using a different measure of study size.  
The data set includes studies from 1978 to 2020. As discussed already, several studies 
offer more than one observation, and we include all of them in the dataset. Observations for a 
total of 8 services and 22 countries are included. As is traditionally the case with cross sections, 
the data set of studies suffers from unobserved heterogeneity, as not all relevant moderators or 
control variables may have been coded. 
The inclusion of studies that used translog cost functions also required calculating the 
individual statistic where the estimate of economies of scale, as opposed to the cost elasticity of 
output, was reported. When the study estimated both the Cobb-Douglas and translog functional 
forms of the cost function, the translog estimate of cost elasticity of output was selected for 
consistency, unless the Cobb-Douglas estimate was the preferred estimate of the author.  
The alternative use of the Caves et al. (1984) measure of economies of scale and the 
Baumol et al. (1988) measure introduces a certain level of heterogeneity in the value of the 
dependent variable. The former, as we discussed earlier, includes in the estimation of economies 
of scale a measure of network length. As it was not possible to completely homogenize the 
statistics from the different studies, our meta-regression accordingly controls for this fact with a 
variable (baumol) which takes a value of one for the studies using the Baumol et al. (1988) 
measure of economies of scale and a value of zero otherwise.  
Sample dependency in meta-analysis is a common risk that can manifest itself in a variety 





same sample). This may include observations obtained from different estimation methods over 
the same sample or the use of the same data sample by many different researchers. Fortunately, 
all of the studies included in our dataset use different samples. This limits sample dependency to 
the greatest possible extent, making our observations virtually fully independent. In our dataset, 
we also include the author’s preferred model specification or estimation in the cases where more 
than one regression is run on the same sample. However, it is the case that several studies present 
estimations over different samples. In some cases, the samples are independent from each other, 
and their inclusion as separate observations does not present further problems. In other cases, 
several estimations are obtained from different sub-sets of the same sample. We also include 
them as separate observations, but control in our meta-regression with a dummy variable for 
studies from which we obtain more than one data point. 
A different type of dependency is that caused by errors in the specifications of the 
econometric model that are reproduced in other studies. In our sample, this would include, for 
instance, the need to control for the possibility of joint public and private provision of the service 
being analyzed, or the possibility of multi-product functions. We define moderators in our right-
hand side of the equation to control for such occurrences.  
4.2 Meta-regression 
As discussed, the studies analyzed differ in many critical dimensions, including the 
functional form of the cost equation, the estimation method, and even the measure of production. 
The presence of this significant “between-study heterogeneity” requires the application of meta-
regression techniques that allow for random-effects estimation rather than the fixed-effect meta-
analysis commonly employed for highly homogenous sets of studies. With the meta-regression 
we can investigate “the extent to which statistical heterogeneity between results of multiple 





p. 493).  
In a random-effects meta-regression, the individual study estimates of the variable of 
interest y are assumed to be distributed normally around a mean effect θ and with a between-
study variance τ2 and a standard error of each study denoted as σi. More specifically, we assume, 
following Harbord and Higgings (2008) that: 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖|𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖 ∼ 𝑁𝑁(𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖 ,𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖2)where 𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖 ∼ 𝑁𝑁�𝜃𝜃, 𝜏𝜏
2 �: so 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 ∼
𝑁𝑁(𝜃𝜃,𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖2 + 𝜏𝜏2). Or equivalently: 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 = 𝜃𝜃 + 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖; where 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖 ∼ 𝑁𝑁(0, 𝜏𝜏2) and 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖 ∼ 𝑁𝑁(0,𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖2) 
Our dependent variable (y) for the meta-analysis is the cost elasticity of output. 
Regressors include the moderators identified during the process of coding and discussed above. 
We perform variance-Weighted Least Squares (WLS) regression analysis to attach more weight 
to estimations with lower standard error and thus believed to be more accurate.6 We aim to 
estimate the average (true) cost elasticity of output for local public service delivery. The 
algorithm used for the estimation calculates first the between study variance (τ2) and later the β-
coefficients using as weights 1
𝜎𝜎2+ 𝜏𝜏2
.  
The unconditional (average) cost elasticity of output in our sample of 76 observations is 
0.597: if service output increases by 1 percent, the cost of provision increases by 0.6 percent, 
signaling some substantial economies of scale. The results of the meta-regression are presented 
in the next section below. 
An additional issue we need to address in our analysis is that of potential publication bias 
in our data sample. As indicated above, publication bias may be present because of the higher 
likelihood that a study is published if it reports statistically significant results. Thus, following 
Bom and Ligthart (2009) we assume that: 𝜃𝜃�𝑖𝑖 = 𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖 + 𝑔𝑔 �𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠�𝜃𝜃�𝑖𝑖�� + 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖; where 𝜃𝜃�𝑖𝑖 represents the 
 





observed estimates, 𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖is the population parameter and μ is the sampling error. 
So, if there is publication bias, the insertion of the standard errors in the meta-regression 
should yield statistically significant coefficients for that variable. Previous studies have assumed 
publication bias is linear (Card & Krueger, 1995), whereas others (Stanley & Doucouliagos, 
2007) argue the relationship between the estimate and its standard error is more likely to be non-
linear and propose a quadratic approximation. In their study of the output elasticity of public 
capital, Bom and Ligthart (2009) present a comprehensive analysis of publication bias and we 
follow their methodology in our analysis. Our analysis will allow for identifying the direction of 
the bias and select the appropriate control for our meta-regression including all relevant 
moderators. 
Again following Bom and Ligthart (2009), we estimate the equation: 




𝐷𝐷𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖 + 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖              (1)                             
where, as discussed, 𝜃𝜃�𝑖𝑖 represents the observed cost elasticity estimates, 𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖 is the population 
parameter and μ is the sampling error. The term ∑ 𝛽𝛽𝑗𝑗𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑁𝑁𝑗𝑗=1  represents the moderator variables 
coded in our meta-analysis, whereas 𝐷𝐷𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 (𝐷𝐷𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖) are dummy variables coded 1 if 𝜃𝜃�𝑖𝑖 is positive 
(negative) and zero otherwise. They are interacted with the standard errors of 𝜃𝜃�𝑖𝑖. The structure of 
the equation allows us to test for different versions of publication bias. 
If the term ∑ 𝛽𝛽𝑗𝑗𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑁𝑁𝑗𝑗=1  is eliminated, we can test for publication bias in the (assumed) 





included in the regression as moderators, we are able to test for bidirectional publication bias. 
Lastly, if we include solely the standard error as one term in the regression (that is, 𝐷𝐷𝑝𝑝 = 𝐷𝐷𝑛𝑛 =





introduce the non-linear publication bias test. Thus, if h=1, we test for linear publication bias, but 
if h=2, we assume a quadratic, non-linear relation between the estimates and their standard 
errors.  
4.3 Identifying moderator variables: The coding process and related hypotheses 
During the process of coding the empirical papers identified, we uncovered a number of 
features that may have influenced the overall results found in the previous empirical literature. 
Accordingly, dummy variables were created to control for them. A complete list of variables is 
provided in Table 1. Not all of these potential moderators were used in the regression analysis. 
Those that lacked statistical significance were eventually dropped in the analysis. Here we 
discuss the main issues addressed.  
Table 1: Moderator Variables Coded from the Literature Review 
Dimension Variable Definition Obs. 
Year of 
Survey 
1970s Value 1 if survey year from that decade, 0 otherwise. 18 
1980s Value 1 if survey year from that decade, 0 otherwise. 6 
1990s Value 1 if survey year from that decade, 0 otherwise. 21 
2000s Value 1 if survey year from that decade, 0 otherwise. 18 
2010 Value 1 if survey year from that decade, 0 otherwise. 13 
Data Years  YearsData Value 1 if more than one year, 0 otherwise. 29 
Sector Education Value 1 if it focuses on Education, 0 otherwise. 15 
Water and Sanitation Value 1 if it focuses on Water and Sanitation, 0 otherwise. 18 
Garbage Collection Value 1 if it focuses on Garbage collection, 0 otherwise. 20 
Urban Transportation Value 1 if it focuses on Urban transportation, 0 otherwise. 10 
Other Services Value 1 if it focuses on a sector not specified before, 0 otherwise. 13 
Country USA Value 1 if the data is from USA, 0 otherwise 28 
Spain Value 1 if the data is from Spain, 0 otherwise 16 
UK Value 1 if the data is from UK, 0 otherwise 4 
Other countries Value 1 if the data is from a country not listed before, 0 otherwise.  28 
Unit of 
Analysis 
Jurisdictions Value 1 if a jurisdictional unit is focus of analysis, 0 if a production unit 




OLS Value 1 if it uses Ordinary Least Squares, 0 otherwise. 35 
SUR Value 1 if it uses Seemingly Unrelated Regression, 0 otherwise. 22 
MLE Value 1 if it uses Maximum Likelihood Estimation, 0 otherwise. 6 
2SLS Value 1 if it uses Two-Stages Least Squares, 0 otherwise. 4 
FE Value 1 if it uses Fixed Effects, 0 otherwise. 4 
GLS Value 1 if it uses Generalized Least Squares, 0 otherwise. 3 
GMM Value 1 if it uses Generalized Method of Moments, 0 otherwise. 1 
BYS Value 1 if it uses Spatial Bayesian, 0 otherwise. 1 
Dataset 
Structure 
Cross Section Value 1 if the structure is a Cross Section, 0 otherwise. 48 
Panel Value 1 if the structure is a Panel, 0 otherwise. 22 





Time series Value 1 if the structure is a Time Series, 0 otherwise. 2 
Cost function 
form 
Log linear Value 1 if the cost function is Log linear, 0 otherwise. 37 
Linear Value 1 if the cost function is Linear, 0 otherwise. 6 
Translog Value 1 if the cost function is a Translog, 0 otherwise. 31 
Quadratic Value 1 if the cost function is Quadratic, 0 otherwise. 2 
Expend. Data Expenditure Value 1 if expenditure data used for dependent variable, 0 if cost data 27 
Output Data Physical Output Value 1 if a measure of physical output is used, 0 if population used as 




Positive Elasticity Value 1 is the cost elasticity observed is > 0 60 
Negative Elasticity Value 1 if the cost elasticity observed is < 0 16 
Definition of 
EOS 





Multiple Observation Value 1 if it has multiple observations, 0 otherwise 33 
Population 
Density 
Population Density Value 1 if Population Density is used as control variable, 0 otherwise. 31 
 
First, our coding process included the creation of a variable for the country in which the 
study took place. Almost half of the 76 observations eventually considered for the meta-
regression were from U.S.-based studies (28), but the sample also included several European, 
Asian, and Latin American countries. The dataset also creates a moderator variable representing 
whether the unit of analysis for the study was a production unit (e.g., a bus public company) or a 
jurisdiction (including studies with municipal, district, or city focus). A certain overlap is 
observed, however, between this variable and the one that denotes whether cost or expenditure 
data were used as the dependent variable of the analysis, perhaps increasing the risk of multi-
collinearity if both variables are included at the same time. 
In terms of the characteristics of the dataset used in studies reviewed, we created 
dummies denoting cross-section, panel, or time series data sets. As Berechman and Giuliano 
(1984) point out, cross sectional data renders biased estimates as it assumes homogeneity of the 
observations (i.e. jurisdictions, public companies, etc.). However, the direction of this bias is not 
clear and the answer must be left to the empirical analysis. Equally, we coded the estimation 
method of the cost function, a variable also closely linked to the dataset structure.  





studies using linear, log-linear or translog functional forms of the production cost function. As 
discussed, the translog modeling framework, which reduces the assumptions imposed on the 
behavior of the dependent variable, is expected to provide more solid estimations results; but 
here, again, the impact on the estimated coefficient is an empirical issue.  
Another dummy variable was created to denote whether expenditure (as opposed to cost) 
data were (1) or were not (0) used to create the dependent variable in the analysis; the presence 
of this moderator is expected to bias downwards the estimates of economies of scale. In addition, 
we created a dummy variable denoting whether the output variable used population as a proxy 
(0) or used a physical measure of output (1), such as gallons of water or tons of garbage.  
Other moderator variables created during the coding process included a variable denoting 
whether the Baumol et al. (1988) or the Caves et al. (1984) definitions of economies of scale 
were used in the study. It is to be expected—as already discussed above—that the estimated cost 
elasticity of output would be lower when the latter measure is used in the analysis. In addition, 
we created dummies for whether the study controlled for service production alternatives (i.e., 
private, public, volunteer services), for cases where the analysis was disaggregated by population 
groups, for cases where more than one observation was obtained from the same study, and for 
whether the study controlled for population density. Finally, our model included the elasticity’s 
standard errors, the degrees of freedom for each study, the number of years for which data were 
available in each study, and the total number of observations as size variables and controls for 
the robustness of results. 
The model specification also included moderators that should allow us to control for 
important econometric considerations. We coded papers by the year of their publication and the 





values of our dependent variable due to changes in productive technology. In some sectors, 
technological advances have been offering greater flexibility of production (i.e., possibilities for 
diversification with relatively lower levels of production) with lower relative fixed capital 
investment requirements, which may have somewhat reduced the potential for economies of 
scale if total costs of production are considered. From that point of view, earlier analysis may 
show greater potential for economies of scale than later ones. 
Another important control variable that was coded is the type of public service that was 
the focus of the study. As discussed in our theoretical framework, we would expect to find 
greater economies of scale in more capital-intensive services such as urban transportation or 
water supply and sanitation, where spreading fixed costs among larger clienteles could lead to 
lower average costs. 
Finally, our sample of studies used a great diversity of data sets, which minimizes the 
presence of data dependency or sample overlap.7  
Funnel plots are a visual tool for dealing with publication and other bias in meta-analysis 
(Sterne & Harbord, 2004; p. 127). Publication bias exists when the probability of a study being 
published is higher if it reports statistically significant results (Bom & Ligthart, 2009). The term 
funnel plot is drawn from the “inverted funnel” shape that the scatter plot of the variable of 
interest and the measure of study size take in the absence of publication bias.  
In our meta-analysis, each point in the funnel plots presented below depicts a particular 
study’s value of the cost elasticity of production in the horizontal axis, and its standard error (or 
inverted degrees of freedom when so stated) as the measure of study size in the vertical axis. If 
 
7 For example, an area where there is potential for dataset dependency is that of comparative fiscal decentralization 





the sample of 76 observations (from 56 studies) considered in this meta-analysis were not to 
display publication bias, we should expect the data points representing the studies of smaller size 
(larger standard error) to scatter widely at the bottom of the funnel, whereas those studies with 
the smaller standard error (or lower value of the inverse degrees of freedom) would concentrate 
at the top around the “true” effect value.  
 Figure 1. Cost Elasticity Funnel Plot Analysis, Pseudo 95% Confidence Limits 
As shown in Table 2, the sample unconditional mean is 0.597, which indicates the 
existence of (some) economies of scale, with a minimum value of the cost elasticity of output of 
-0.947 and a maximum of 1.524. Thus, the observations in the data set range from showing large 
economies of scale to sizable decreasing returns to scale.  
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics 
 Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
All  76 0.597 0.515 -0.947 1.524 
Education 15 0.311 0.558 -0.632 1.524 
Garbage Collection 20 0.933 0.198 0.272 1.366 
Water and Sanitation 18 0.716 0.314 -0.245 1.086 
Chart 1. All obs. with reported standard errors. 
 
Chart 2. Obs. weighted by inv. deg. of freedom. 
 
Chart 3. Obs. using log-linear functions. 
 






Chart 1 in Figure 1 displays the first funnel plot, where all 55 observations for which we 
have standard errors reported are plotted. It includes observations for most of the public services 
considered and for all types of functional forms of the cost function being reviewed. The plug-in 
routine for Stata-generated funnel plots calculates the fixed effects meta-estimate, which 
determines the position of the solid vertical line of the chart. The dependent variable is the cost 
elasticity of output and the independent variable the standard error of the coefficient. This is a 
weighted average where the weights represent the inverse variance of the estimate. The 
discontinuous lines that form the inverted “funnel” represent the 95% confidence limits around 
the summary treatment effects. It is important to note that the fixed effects estimate obtained 
from the funnel plots does not include any of the moderator variables that will be used later on in 
the meta-regression. 
The funnel plot on Chart 1 presents a twin-peak structure that is relatively uncommon in 
meta-analysis. A first group of studies with relatively low standard errors concentrate around a 
value of 1 for the cost elasticity of output, signaling from limited returns to scale or slight 
diseconomies of scale. A second peak is found around the value 0 of cost elasticity of output, 
signaling relatively large economies of scale with similarly small standard errors. This latter 
group of studies is considerably smaller in number though. Only 19 observations out of the 55 
for which standard errors are available in our sample reported a cost elasticity of output below 
0.5. In this group, 8 of those observations corresponded to studies in the education sector, and 12 
of them used a log-linear function to model the cost function.  
The remaining 36 observations in the sample with standard errors reported included 18 
observations on the garbage services sector, 8 in the water supply services and sanitation services 





24 of them use cross sectional data, 14 assume a translog cost functional form, and 13 of them 
took place in the USA.  
The inclusion in the funnel plot analysis of those observations that do not report standard 
errors does not significantly change the results (see Chart 2). In this chart, the measure of size 
used is the inverse of the degrees of freedom, a common alternative to the individual standard 
errors. The pattern is somewhat less clear, although the two-peak structure is also identifiable 
around values of the cost elasticity coefficient of 1 and 0. Neither funnel plot (Charts 1 and 2) 
presents the symmetrical distribution that would signal absence of publication bias. The large 
heterogeneity among the studies and services analyzed prevents this. The first two funnel plots, 
in addition, do not allow us to establish the direction of the publication bias, and thus additional 
quantitative analysis will be undertaken to test for it in the next section. 
We can, however, look more closely at the drivers of the “twin peak” distribution 
obtained from the general funnel plots. As discussed, it would seem to be partially determined by 
the distribution of studies using a log-linear function as the modeling framework for the 
estimation of cost elasticities. Chart 3 shows the funnel plot obtained from the representation of 
just such studies. The two peaks around the 1 and 0 values of the cost elasticity of output 
dependent variable are clearly identifiable. 
This compares with a completely different distribution of studies which use the translog 
function as the modeling framework for the estimation of production costs. In Chart 4 we can 
observe that those studies report, in general, very low standard errors and although the funnel 
shape that would indicate absence of publication bias is also absent, values of the cost elasticity 
coefficient bunch in the interval 0.5 to 1. 





services are leading the overall distribution of observations towards the two-peaked structure 
observed. Figure 2 below depicts the funnel plots for the four sectors that contain the largest 
numbers of observations, namely education, garbage collection, water supply and sanitation, and 
urban transportation services. These four sectors account for 59 out of the 76 observations in the 
sample. As we mentioned, a total of six observations from studies on education reported cost 
elasticity coefficients lower than 0.5 (Chart 5), while only two observations for water supply and 
one for garbage collection report those low elasticities.  
Figure 2. Cost Elasticity Funnel Plot Analysis, Pseudo 95% Confidence Limits, Sectoral 
Distribution 
Chart 6 in Figure 2, depicting the funnel plot for observations on the garbage collection 
sector, offers the single-peaked, well-behaved funnel plot distribution that presumes absence of 
publication bias. Most of the observations are within the 95% confidence interval defined by the 
funnel, and the “true” value of the cost elasticity of output in this sector seems to be defined at 
around 0.9. The plots for the water supply and urban transportation sector show also a relatively 
Chart 5.  Obs., Education  
 
Chart 6. Obs., Garbage Collection  
 
Chart 7.  Obs., Water Supply and Sanitation 
 






standard distribution (meaning single peaked, with most of the observations contained within the 
95% confidence interval of the inverted funnel) of observations.  
Thus, we can conclude that the double peaked plot obtained in Chart 1 is driven by the 
observations from studies in the education sector which yield values of the cost elasticity of 
output that are close to 0, signaling sizable economies of scale. For those observations, a log-
linear form for the estimation of the cost function was primarily used. We anticipate this may 
have important implications for our meta-regression analysis, to which we turn next.  
5. Meta-regression Analysis 
5.1 Testing for publication bias 
We test first for publication bias under the assumption of homogeneity among studies in 
specification (1). Thus, we do not include any of the moderator variables identified during the 
coding process in our meta-regression. If the only differences between studies are due to 
sampling error (“within-study” heterogeneity), then the fixed effects estimation would be the 
adequate estimation methodology. If, however, large “between-study” heterogeneity is expected, 
then we should consider the use of random effects estimation to account for both sources of 
heterogeneity. Main results are reported in Tables 3 and 4. 
Table 3: Publication Bias Analysis, Fixed Effects 
  Output Cost Elast. α αp αn R2 N Q-test I2 
No PB 0.295** (0.141)       0.293 55 14699.26*** 99.60% 
Linear PB. 
Unidirectional 0.270*   (0.146) 
31.843* 
(18.11)     0.316 55     
Linear PB.  
Bidirectional 0.263*   (0.143)   
64.068** 
(24.400) -599.918 0.369 55     
Non-linear PB. 
Unidirectional 0.293** (0.143) 
34.203 
(44.030)     0.294 55     
Non-linear PB. 




(30.362) 0.295 55     
Notes: Where I2 is variation due to “between-study” heterogeneity and the Q-test is of 
Heterogeneity with degrees of freedom of 54. Standard errors in parenthesis. ***, **, * = 






Table 3 shows the fixed effects estimates. Our estimate of cost elasticity of output under 
this assumption is somewhat smaller than the simple average for all estimates. The literature may 
have favored the publication of studies that reported negative cost elasticity of output, signaling 
large economies of scale in public good provision. As we have seen, most of these studies belong 
to the area of education. The fixed effects estimates are however compromised by the large 
amount of between-study heterogeneity as indicated by the Q-test.8 In addition, the I2 test shows 
that 99.6% of the heterogeneity found in the sample is due to “between-study” differences. 
Table 4. Publication Bias Analysis, Random Effects 
  Output Cost Elast. α αp αn N I2 Residual 
No PB 0.581*** (0.064)       55 99.49% 
Linear PB. 
Unidirectional 0.681*** (0.105) -1.391 (1.149)     55 99.56% 
Linear PB.  




(1.131) 55 99.25% 
Non-linear PB. 
Unidirectional 0.640*** (0.071) -28.238691     55 99.63% 
Non-linear PB. 




(15.855) 55 99.64% 
Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis. ***, **, * = statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10%.  
Due to the large heterogeneity among studies (in sectors, modeling frameworks, etc.), 
random effects estimation is recommended. These results are shown in Table 4. These estimates 
confirm the nature and the direction of the publication bias, with studies reporting negative 
values of cost elasticity of output driving the “true” average value in our sample. 
However, the estimations presented in Tables 3 and 4 explain a small amount of the 
between study variation, an average of 30 percent. We therefore turn to analyzing the case where 
observed heterogeneity between studies with the insertion of moderator variables in the meta-
regression is allowed. In line with Harbord and Higgings (2008; p. 497) and our earlier results, 
 
8 The Q-test is a common measure of heterogeneity used in the literature. It is the sum of the squared deviations of 





we do not estimate the fixed effects meta-regression, as such estimation assumes that “all 
heterogeneity can be explained by the covariates,” leading to excessive type I errors in cases (as 
ours) of unobserved heterogeneity. In the random effects model, the weights used in the weighted 
least squares estimation include not only the standard errors of each individual observation, but 
the between study variance.  
Table 5 presents the random effects estimation of the model with observed heterogeneity. 
The first column reports results without testing for publication bias, while the second and third 
columns of Table 5 include the publication bias test in its linear and non-linear form, 
respectively. This first set of results offer interesting insights as to the determinants of the 
estimations found in the empirical literature of the cost elasticity of output. The first relevant 
result is the value of the conditional mean of the cost elasticity of output. In principle, due to the 
larger amount of “between-study heterogeneity” explained under the linear publication bias test, 
it would seem that such estimation presents the better fit for the model. The estimated coefficient 
for the constant term, the conditional mean of the sample, is 0.529. This signals the presence of 
some economies of scale for works published in the 2010s, in sectors other than education and 
garbage collection that used predominantly the Cobb-Douglas form approach to the cost 
production function, and also used cost as opposed to expenditure data and population as a proxy 
for output. The non-linear publication bias test yields a conditional mean of the cost elasticity of 
output of 0.297, signaling economies of scale. The results, using studies published in the last 
decade as the reference group, also show large variations in the value of the conditional mean 
depending on the inclusion of the publication bias test. Once we control for bidirectional 
publication bias, the estimates of the cost elasticity of output increase substantially, lowering the 





Our time dummies show that, having the 2010s as reference group, estimates of 
economies of scale seem to have been larger in the 1980s; this is a period in which the 
sophistication of the analyses increases considerably with the generalization of log linear 
function estimation specifications and the first contributions using translog cost functions. 
However, this effect falls considerably later, with the estimates of the cost elasticity of output 
being similar in size between the 1990s and the 2010s. Despite the consistency in the sign of this 
relationship, the results are not statistically significant. We thus find no strong support for the 
hypothesis that modern production methods, incorporating “leaner” technologies and lower 
requirements in terms of capital investment, offer lower potential for economies of scale.  
Table 5. Meta-Regression Results, Random Effects Estimation 
 





Constant 0.224       (0.248) 0.529**   (0.228) 0.297       (0.244) 
1970s 0.662*** (0.158) 0.573*** (0.137) 0.637*** (0.153) 
1980s 0.149       (0.220) 0.205       (0.188) 0.120       (0.215) 
1990s 0.329*     (0.175) 0.335**   (0.150) 0.293*     (0.170) 
2000s 0.375**   (0.151) 0.370*** (0.131) 0.373**   (0.147) 
Education -0.453**   (0.180) -0.508*** (0.155) -0.504*** (0.176) 
Garbage Collection 0.732*** (0.156) 0.528*** (0.146) 0.708*** (0.152) 
Translog Cost Function 0.539*** (0.132) 0.318**   (0.127) 0.507*** (0.128) 
Expenditure Data 0.235*     (0.132) 0.202*     (0.113) 0.272**   (0.129) 
Physical Output -0.276*     (0.135) -0.289**   (0.117) -0.279       (0.131) 
Baumol -0.170       (0.130) -0.195       (0.151) -0.185       (0.170) 
Multiple Observations 0.172       (0.130) 0.152       (0.111) 0.146       (0.126) 
Population Density -0.309*** (0.096) -0.280*** (0.082) -0.303*** (0.093) 
αp  -0.681       (0.835) -7.821     (14.961) 
αn  -4.465*** (0.991) -31.968** (12.276) 
Observations  76 55 55 
Residual Variation due to 
Heterogeneity 
96.23% 97.00% 97.56% 
Proportion of Between-Study 
Variance Explained 
70.02% 79.01% 72.09% 
τ2 (Between-study Variance) 0.065 0.045 0.060 
Prob > F  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis. ***, **, * = statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10%.  
Our initial hypotheses regarding the sectoral distribution of economies of scale and 
capital input intensity are now confronted with opposing empirical evidence. Among the critical 





different model specifications. Economies of scale seem to be potentially greater in the education 
sector despite the presumption that this service displays a more labor-intensive production 
method and even after other moderator variables are included in the analysis. Studies analyzing 
economies of scale in the garbage collection sector, an assumed capital-intensive sector, 
displayed higher cost elasticities of output, meaning lower economies of scale—although the 
results were not statistically significant. The results for the water and sanitation sector were not 
found statistically significant either in the alternative model specifications.  
From the results in Table 5, we can also see that greater sophistication in the modeling of 
production costs leads to smaller estimates of economies of scale. The use of the translog 
function has, all other things equal, led to higher estimates of cost elasticity of output in the 
literature. Acknowledging that the translog functions offers substantial advantages in the study of 
economies of scale, we can conclude that the use of log linear (Cobb-Douglas based) functional 
forms for the estimation of economies of scale may have led to the overestimation of economies 
of scale across the board. Lastly, the empirical results show the relevance of controlling for 
population density in the evaluation of economies of scale, as Tran et al. (2018) have observed. 
Studies using population density as a moderator generally report lower estimates of cost 
elasticity of output, increasing the extent of economies of scale.  
The bias introduced in the analysis of economies of scale using inadequate measures of 
output is also made obvious from the results in Table 5. The use of expenditure data, as opposed 
to cost data, substantially increases the estimates of cost elasticity of output, thus reducing the 
perceived potential of economies of scale. Also, as previously discussed, the use of expenditure 
data as a proxy for production costs introduces distortions in the analysis, as expenditure data 





the use of physical output instead of population as a proxy for production proves to be critically 
important for the results obtained. As expected, more accurate (physical) measures of output led 
to larger estimates of economies of scale in the literature.  
Lastly, the meta-regression results in Table 5 show no impact from the use of different 
definitions of economies of scale (i.e., Baumol or Caves). We interpret this as a positive sign for 
the consistency of our sample; more specifically, the negative result offers some relief regarding 
the possible distortion introduced by the heterogeneity in the measurement of our dependent 
variable. The results in Table 5 also show that studies with multiple observations may tend to 
report greater estimates of cost elasticity of output, that is, smaller economies of scale, although 
the significance of the coefficients was not robust to different model specifications.  
Several other control variables were included in earlier model specifications but were 
found not significant. Country dummies were consistently found to be not significant. Their 
introduction as moderators in some cases was even pernicious as they could display high 
correlation with other moderators (for instance, 10 of the 16 observations from Spain come from 
studies in the garbage collection sector, creating multicollinearity between the country and the 
sectoral dummy). Individual significance tests also recommended their elimination from the 
sample with no loss of explanatory value. The variables identifying the structure of the dataset 
used in the study (e.g., cross-sections, panel, etc.), and the estimation method (e.g., OLS, SUR, 
etc.) proved to be equally non-significant. As expected, high correlation was found between the 
variables measuring the dataset structure, the estimation methodologies, and the form of the cost 
function, so most had to be discarded from the final specification. We also note that the results in 
Table 5 were robust to the inclusion or not of these other control variables. 





education. We saw in Table 1 that the mean cost elasticity of output in the sector of education is 
the lowest among the three main sectoral groups of observations. Also, in Chart 5 in Figure 2, we 
observed that most of the observations reporting negative or low output cost elasticity are 
obtained from studies in the education sector. Thus, in order to test the robustness of our results 
to sectoral composition, we estimate additional model specifications which alternatively exclude 
each of the three sectors for which the largest number of observations is obtained (i.e., education, 
garbage collection, and water and sanitation). The results are shown in Table 6. For brevity, only 
selected variables are reported. 
Table 6. Sectoral Disaggregation. Random Effects Estimation 
 (1) Without Education (2) Without Water and Sanitation (3) Without Garbage 
Constant 0.267       (0.256) -0.380          (0.394) -0.312        (0.349) 
(1) Garbage Collection 
(2) Education 
(3) Water and Sanit. 0.793*** (0.158) -0.859*** (0.190) 0.075       (0.173) 
1970s 0.489**   (0.201) 0.989*** (0.179) 0.549*** (0.180) 
1980s 0.349       (0.201) 0.709*** (0.209) -0.212       (0.309) 
1990s 0.272       (0.197) 0.827*** (0.190) 0.154       (0.224) 
2000s 0.363**   (0.172) 0.857*** (0.180) -0.083       (0.267) 
Translog Cost Function 0.507*** (0.138) 0.431**   (0.180) 0.748*** (0.161) 
Expenditure Data 0.092       (0.141) 0.163       (0.162) 0.324       (0.196) 
Physical Output -0.199       (0.149) -0.430*** (0.152) 0.216       (0.172) 
Baumol -0.128       (0.172) 0.033       (0.286) -0.041       (0.206) 
Multiple Observations -0.0004     (0.144) 0.567*** (0.156) 0.177       (0.184) 
Population Density -0.306*** (0.108) -0.218*     (0.115) -0.199       (0.180) 
Number of Observations  61 58 56 
Residual Variation due to 
Heterogeneity 94.16% 94.80% 95.73% 
Proportion of Between Study 
Variance Explained 67.72% 62.84% 61.85% 
τ2 (Between-study Variance) 0.059 0.089 0.083 
Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis. ***, **, * = statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10%.  
 
The significance and robustness of the results obtained in Table 5 do not seem to be 
affected by any particular sector. The alternate exclusion of education, water and sanitation, and 
garbage collection from the estimations changes the constant and sectoral coefficients 





function continues to determine results and leads to lower estimates of economies of scale, as is 
the case with the use of expenditure over cost data. As expected, the variation is wider for the 
estimates of physical output, as this variable is substantially more correlated with the sectoral 
studies (e.g., education studies use population as their measure of output).9 
6. Conclusions 
Our review of the empirical literature shows that the evidence on the existence of 
economies of scale in the delivery of local public services is not very strong, with multiple 
studies reporting constant or decreasing returns to scale in a variety of services. In this paper, we 
use meta-analysis to systematize the wide range of empirical approaches and modeling 
frameworks found in the literature and help identify the determinants behind the results found.  
At best, the inclusion of studies from several sectors in our analysis seems to confirm the 
presence of moderately increasing to constant returns to scale in the provision of local services. 
The potential for economies of scale seems to differ greatly, at least across three traditional 
services: education, water and sanitation, and garbage collection, being highest for education and 
lowest for garbage collection. Our analysis also offers guidelines for future empirical research in 
this area. Physical output and production cost data should be used, together with translog 
specifications for the modeling of cost functions.  
The estimates of economies of scale selected for our meta-regression are those at the 
mean of the sample distribution of each study. As such, our analysis does not offer insights 
regarding the extent and length of those economies of scale. However, it is unlikely, in the 
context of U-shaped long average cost functions, that such economies of scale will be pervasive 
 
9 Our analysis also included the estimation of sector-specific meta-regressions for those sectors with sufficient 
observations (garbage and water supply and sanitation). However, as expected little variation was found among the 





well beyond the average production point.  
This general conclusion may be somewhat surprising to policymakers in the many 
countries where there has been a significant push for reforming the vertical structure of 
government by using forced jurisdictional consolidation programs. The evidence is so far 
generally weak that larger “client” bases allow reducing the average costs of production in the 
delivery of most local public services beyond certain a modest jurisdiction size, which many 
studies in this literature have estimated at 10,000 residents. Any program of jurisdictional 
consolidation needs to be anchored on an analysis of the potential economies of scale on the 
services that have been decentralized to those units.  
For conducting such an analysis, this paper offers significant methodological insights: 
using production cost data and a translog specification function. In short, the expected savings 
from enlarging population size at the local government level may not be present at all and should 
not be automatically assumed. Conducting the proper analysis, we might find cases where 
jurisdictional consolidation is profitable or even appropriate for other causes, such as reducing 
administrative overhead or developing adequate administrative capacity and skills; however, 
experience suggests that forced jurisdictional consolidation may often fail to bring cost or scale 
advantages. When considering jurisdictional consolidation, it would be also desirable to keep in 
mind that the desirable economies of scale may also be obtained via alternate processes such as 
privatization or inter-jurisdictional cooperation. In any case, transaction costs due to the need for 
monitoring the quality of service provision or negotiation with partners and providers may be 
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